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Federalism in Labor Relations-The Last Decade
LEE MODJESKA*
The National Labor Relations Act . . . leaves much to the states, though Congress has
refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting indications of
congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed concern over the growth of "the mighty
oak of this Court's labor pre-emption doctrine, which sweeps ever outward though
still totally uninformed by any express directive from Congress.''2 In his view, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), management, and labor compete "in
urging the Court to sweep into the maw of labor relations law concerns that would
have been regarded as totally peripheral to that body of law by the Congresses which
enacted the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act." '3
Distinguished labor scholars have observed that "[n]o legal issue in the field of
collective bargaining has been presented to the Supreme Court more frequently in the
past thirty years than that of the preemption of state law, and perhaps no other legal
issue has been left in quite as much confusion." 4 This essay reviews the course of
labor preemption doctrine during the last decade.
* Joseph S. Platt -'Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
B.A., Antioch College, 1955; J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1960. This essay had its origins in a paper delivered at the
Fifth Annual Stetson University College of Law Conference on Labor and Employment Law, March 3, 1989.
1. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953). See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 523 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting):
Pre-emption cases in the labor law area are often difficult because we must decide the questions presented
without any clear guidance from Congress .... We have developed standards to assist us in our task... but
those standards are by necessity general ones which may not provide as much assistance as we would like in
particular cases. This is especially true when the case is an unusual one.
Id.
2. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 622 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3. Id.
4. A. Cox, D. Boc & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 895 (10th ed. 1986). Professors Meltzer
and Henderson make the following observation:
The customary difficulties created by the absence of legislative guidance were aggravated by two considerations:
first, continuing divisions in the community over the adequacy of the national regulation; and, second, unions
generally argued for (while employers opposed) preemption of state authority. Consequently, courts and
ultimately the Supreme Court and the Justices individually seemed to be choosing not only between the merits
of state and federal regulation, but also between one interest or the other. Such choices involved obvious
tensions with an objective of the Norris-LaGuardia Act-limiting judicial policy making.
B. MaztzER & S. HENDERSON, LABOR LAw CASES. MATERIALS AND PROBLESs 731 (3d ed. 1985).
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IH. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The early years of this century saw the gathering storm of the labor wars and the
ultimate federal legitimization of employee combination. 5 Congress extended legis-
lative protection for employee organizational rights, curtailed judicial intervention in
labor disputes, and endorsed collective bargaining as a system of industrial
self-government. 6 The Railway Labor Act of 1926, 7 the Norris-LaGuardia Act of
1932,8 and the Wagner Act of 1935, 9 envisaged equalization of bargaining power,
worker betterment, and a framework for labor peace. In this legislation Congress
safeguarded against employer interference in the rights of employees to self-
organization, to collective bargaining through their chosen representatives, and to
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection. '0
Toward mid-century the pendulum swung in response to perceived excesses of
union power. 1' The Taft-Hartley Act of 194712 protected employee rights to refrain
from unionism, limited union control over the employment relationship, and curtailed
labor's strike and boycott weapons. The Landrum-Griffin Act of 195913 further
restricted labor's picketing and boycott activities, 14 and regulated internal union
affairs. 15
III. TRADITIONAL PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
By mid-century the essential federal statutory framework for labor relations had
thus been laid.' 6 While the federal scheme was extensive if not comprehensive,
Congress did not totally exclude state authority from the area.' 7 "The [National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)] . . . leaves much to the states, though Congress has
refrained from telling us how much." ' 8 The danger of conflict between the state and
5. See generally, F. DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (3d ed. 1966); P. TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (1964).
6. See generally, I. BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY (1950); F. FRANKFURTER & N.
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); J. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN
ECONOMICS, POLmCS, AND THE LAW 1933-1937 (1974).
7. 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982)).
8. 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982)).
9. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1982)).
10. See generally, C. GREOORY & H. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1979).
11. See generally, J. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
IN TRANSIION 1937-1947 (1981); H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAONER ACT TO TAFr-HART.EY (1950).
12. Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
141-197 (1982)).
13. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982)).
14. See generally, C. SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 326-39 (1968).
15. See generally, J. BELLACE & A. BERKOWITZ, THE LANDRUNM-GRIFFIN Acr: TWENY YEARS OF FEDERAL PROTECTION
OF UNION MEMBERS' RItHrs (1979).
16. See generally, A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY (1960).
17. See Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953); Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin Bd.. 336 U.S.
301, 313 (1949); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 773 (1947); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 539
(1945); Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Electrical Workers v. Wisconsin Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 748-51 (1942).
18. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485,488 (1953). "We cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that
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federal systems remained marked in the labor law area. Diverse, conflicting, or
hostile regulation could seriously undermine the uniform collective bargaining system
envisaged by Congress. The Supreme Court, particularly the Warren Court, ' 9 filled
this void with a strong preemption doctrine distinctly reflecting the Court's vision of
an embracing federalism. 20
Under traditional labor law preemption doctrine, summarized as refined in San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,21 the states lack jurisdiction when the
activity is protected by section 7 of the NLRA22 or prohibited by section 8.23 "To
leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal
regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by
Congress and requirements imposed by state law.' '24
Moreover, even where the activity is arguably, though not clearly, subject to
sections 7 and 8, the state courts (and the federal courts) must defer to the exclusive
primary competence of the NLRB for determination of the activity's legal status. The
NLRB may ultimately never define the legal significance of particular activity, but
the failure of the NLRB to so act does not give the states the power to act. "The
governing consideration is that to allow the States to control activities that are
touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions; obviously,
much of this is left to the States." Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289 (1971).
19. See generally, Modjeska, Labor and the Warren Court, 8 U.C. BERKELEY INDUS. REt.. L.J. 479 (1986).
20. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958): "The statutory implications
concerning what has been taken from the States and what has been left to them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated
into concreteness by the process of litigating elucidation." Congressional power to preempt state law derives from the
supremacy clause of article VI of the Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
21. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 276-77.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1982) (Wagner Act). The National Labor Relations Act was amended in 1947 by the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA or Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982), and again in 1959 by the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA or Landrum-Griffin Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
23. See generally, Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights, 51 TrEx. L.
REv. 1037 (1973); Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of
Garmon, 56 VA. L. REV. 1435 (1970); Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954);
Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337 (1972); Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law
Preemption, 41 Oto ST. L.J. 277 (1980); Kirby, Federal Preemption in Labor Relations, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 128 (1968);
Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLuM. L. REv. 469 (1972); McCoid,
Notes on a "G-String": A Study of the "No Man's Land" of Labor Law, 44 MINN. L. REv. 205 (1959); Meltzer, The
Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations (pts. I & 11), 59 COLUM. L. REv. 6, 269 (1959);
Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARV. L. REv. 641 (1961).
24. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244. "Garmon ... does not state a constitutional principle; it merely rationalizes the
problems of coexistence between federal and state regulatory schemes in the field of labor relations .... " Retail Clerks
Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
The underpinnings of Garmon's broad preemptive scope were articulated in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S.
485, 490-91 (1953):
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply
law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific
and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice,
and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently
considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform
application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of
local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. . . .A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of
procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of
substantive law.
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potentially subject to federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict with
national labor policy.'25
This first line of preemption analysis is based predominately upon the primary
jurisdiction of the NLRB. Central to the arguably prohibited branch of the doctrine,
concerned with risk of interference with NLRB jurisdiction, are the significance of
the state interest involved and whether or not the respective controversies presented
to the state and federal forums are identical. 26 Central to the arguably protected
branch of the doctrine are concerns not only of the NLRB's primary jurisdiction but
also of federal supremacy, for there is constitutional objection to state interference
with conduct actually protected by the Act. 27
Applying the foregoing general principles over the years,2 8 the Supreme Court
has held that because of potential NLRA-NLRB conflict the states lack authority to
award damages arising out of peaceful union organizational picketing,2 9 to award
damages against a union for an allegedly discriminatory refusal to refer to employ-
ment through a hiring hall, 30 to apply state antitrust laws to areas carved out for
mandatory collective bargaining, 3t to impose license qualifications on union
agents, 32 to apply antitrust laws to union jurisdictional disputes, 33 to require strike
votes, 34 to limit public utility strikes, 35 to award damages against a union for
25. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246. "Congress has not seen fit to lay down even the most general of guides to
construction of the Act, as it sometimes does, by saying that its regulation either shall or shall not exclude state action."
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 771 (1947). "'Congressional purpose is of course 'the ultimate
touchstone' of preemption analysis. ... Wisconsin Dep't of Indus. v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 290 (1986). "We
must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible."
Garner, 346 U.S. at 488.
26. See generally, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
27. Id.
28. For broad surveys of the course of labor law preemption doctrine see generally, F. BARTOSiC & R. HARTLEY,
LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 37-57 (2d ed. 1986); J. GTIAN & B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS - THE
BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE 333-61 (1988); R. GORIAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW - UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 766-86 (1976); C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1504-98 (2d ed. 1983). Concerning the
juridical forging and vitality of Garmnon principles, Justice Harlan stated as follows:
[A]lthough largely of judicial making, the labor relations pre-emption doctrine finds its basic justification in the
presumed intent of Congress. While we do not assert that the Garmon doctrine is without imperfection, we do
think that it is founded on reasoned principle and that until it is altered by congressional action or by judicial
insights that are born of further experience with it, a heavy burden rests upon those who would, at this late date,
ask this Court to abandon Garmon and set out again in quest of a system more nearly perfect.
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 302 (1971).
29. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625
v. Schermerhorn, 75 U.S. 96 (1963) (picketing to obtain union security agreement violative of valid state right-to-work
law preempted); Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U.S. 126 (1964) (injunction against peaceful
secondary picketing preempted); Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Serv. of
Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965) (injunction against peaceful secondary picketing preempted). See also NLRB v.
Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971) (federal court may enjoin state court order regulating preempted conduct).
30. Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963). See Local No. 207, Int'l Ass'n of
Bridge Workers Union v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963) (tort claim against union for causing discharge preempted).
31. Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959). See also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers
Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
32. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
33. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
34. UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
35. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
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wrongful application of a union security agreement, 36 to regulate or prohibit strikes
deemed contrary to the public interest, 37 to deny unemployment compensation to
persons filing NLRB charges, 38 to decide representation questions, 39 to remedy
unfair labor practices, 4° and to entertain a supervisor's tort suit against a union for
wrongful inducement of discharge. 4'
State jurisdiction and remedies have been permitted in a variety of situations
generally involving areas deemed of serious local concern and/or of only peripheral
concern to the NLRA or federal labor policy, even though aspects of the challenged
conduct were arguably subject to the Act.42 State authority was upheld by the Court,
for example, in cases involving trespass laws applied to peaceful picketing, 43
intentional infliction of emotional distress, 44 picketing of foreign flag vessels, 45
malicious libel, 46 violence, 47 wrongful expulsion from union membership, 48 mass
36. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). See Beasley v. Food Fair, 416
U.S. 653 (1974) (supervisor's damage suit against employer under state right-to-work law).
37. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, Div. 1287 v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963).
38. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967). See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461
U.S. 731 (1983) (unmeritorious retaliatory lawsuit against employees).
39. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947); LaCrosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Bd., 336 U.S.
18 (1949).
40. Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Bd., 338 U.S. 953 (1950).
41. Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669 (1983).
42. See generally, San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44, 247 (1959). In Garmon,
Justice Frankfurter rationalized nonpreemption of certain controversies arguably subject to the NLRA:
[Dlue regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system ... has required us not to find withdrawal
from the States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor
Management Relations Act.. . . Or where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that
Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.
Id. at 243-44. See generally, B. MELTZER & S. HEN DERSON, supra note 4, at 731-32:
Further complications arose from the Court's conviction that some state interests were so strong or traditional,
and the competing federal interest so "peripheral," that Congress did not "intend" to foreclose state
jurisdiction. It followed that state jurisdiction was preserved and could be exercised even though the NLRB had
not previously decided whether the conduct in question was protected, prohibited, or ungoverned by the federal
law. Such exercises of state jurisdiction plainly involved the risk that a state would restrict "protected" activity,
or would devise remedies overlapping with, duplicating, or supplementing federal remedies-consequences
that the general body of preemption doctrine was designed to avoid. But under the balance struck between state
and federal interests in these exceptional classes of cases, such risks became acceptable.
Id.
43. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (employer could
not invoke and union could not be forced to invoke NLRB jurisdiction).
44. Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters. Local 25, 426 U.S. 903 (1977).
45. American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974); Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v.
American Radio Ass'n. 415 U.S. 104 (1974); Incres S.S. Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24
(1963).
46. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966). See also Old Dominion Branch No. 496,
Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974). See generally. Currier, Defamation in Labor Disputes:
Preemption and the New Federal Common Law. 53 VA. L. REv. I (1967).
47. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958). See Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.. 347 U.S. 656 (1954). See also Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
48. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
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picketing, 49 concerted action seeking a union security agreement violative of state
right-to-work law,50 picketing seeking representation of clearly excluded super-
visors, 5 1 and establishment of minimum standards for funding and vesting of
terminated pension plans.5 2 The Court has said that "[i]n such cases, the State's
interest in controlling or remedying the effects of the conduct is balanced against both
the interference with the National Labor Relations Board's ability to adjudicate
controversies committed to it by the Act ... and the risk that the State will sanction
conduct that the Act protects." ' 53
Further, explained Garmon, even if it is determined by the NLRB that the
conduct is neither protected nor prohibited by the Act, the question remains whether
or not the states may regulate the conduct, for Congress left some conduct either
entirely uncontrolled and/or immune from state regulation. 5 4 The federal regulatory
scheme leaves some activities and practices to be controlled by the free play of
economic forces. 55 This second line of preemption analysis, so-called Machinists
preemption,5 6 focuses the inquiry upon whether Congress intended to leave the
conduct unregulated. The Court has said that this "second pre-emption doctrine...
proscribes state regulation and state-law causes of action concerning conduct that
Congress intended to be unregulated, . . . conduct that was to remain a part of the
self-help remedies left to the combatants in labor disputes . . . . 57 State authority
was thus precluded where the Court found Congress intended the areas left
unregulated, such as cases involving certain peaceful secondary activity,5 8 and
intermittent work stoppages.5 9
Another line of preemption analysis involves section 301 of the NLRA. 6 In
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 61 the Court held that section 301 not only
confers federal jurisdiction over unions but also puts sanctions behind collective
bargaining agreements to make them enforceable. The Court held that the substantive
law to apply in section 301 suits was federal law to be fashioned through judicial
inventiveness from existing national labor law and policy. 62 Compatible state law
might be absorbed as part of this new federal law, but state law could no longer
49. Allen-Bradley Local No. I I 11, United Electrical Workers v. Wisconsin Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
50. Local No. 438, Constr. Laborers Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
51. Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, MEBA, 382 U.S. 181 (1965). Cf. MEBA v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173
(1962) (picketing preempted where coverage of supervisors' union under Act uncertain).
52. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
53. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 498-99 (1983).
54. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959).
55. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Local 20, Teamsters
Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). See also New York Tel. Co.
v. New York Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
56. See supra note 55.
57. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 499.
58. Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
59. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
60. The preemptive effect of § 301 involves considerations related to but distinct from those raised by preemption
unaer §§ 7 or 8 or NLRB primary jurisdiction. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212 n.6 (1985).
61. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
62. Id. See generally, Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case,
71 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957).
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remain an independent source of private rights. Federal and not state law and
interpretation would govern. 63
Analyzing the preemptive effect of section 301 in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas
Flour Co.,64 the Court stated that "[t]he dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion
that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered
by the statute, . . . [that] . . . issues raised in suits of a kind covered by § 301 [are]
to be decided according to the precepts of federal labor policy, . . . [and that] . . .
in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to
prevail over inconsistent local rules. "65 State rules purporting to define the meaning
or scope of labor contract terms in contract suits were therefore preempted. 66 The
Supreme Court has also made clear that while state or federal court jurisdiction under
section 301 is not preempted simply because the conduct is also an unfair labor
practice, 67 the applicable federal law or standard nevertheless controls. 68 Further, a
new and evolving question concerns the extent to which section 301 may have a
preemptive effect over noncontractual state rights dependent upon or intertwined with
the labor contract. 69
IV. CURRENT PROBLEMS
A. The Garmon Strand
1. Union Interference With Supervisor's Employment
In Local 926, International Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones,70 the Court
held that a state court action brought by a supervisor for interference by a union with
his contractual relationship with his employer was preempted by the NLRA. 71 The
supervisor's action was predicated upon his belief that the union persuaded his
employer to discharge him because he had worked some years earlier for a nonunion
63. Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act provided that suits for violation of labor-management contracts could be
brought in federal courts. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). Section 301(b) provided that unions could sue or be sued as entities
in federal court. Id. at § 185(b). On its face § 301(a) appeared merely to be jurisdictional, while § 301(b) appeared simply
to provide a procedural remedy lacking at common law. Were § 301(a) deemed jurisdictional but not also substantive, the
enforceability of labor contracts would be left to the vagaries of state law. "The possibility that individual contract terms
might have different meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the
negotiation and administration of collective agreements." Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95,
103 (1962).
64. Local 174. Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
65. Id. at 103-04.
66. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968); Republic Steel Corp.
v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
67. Arnold v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974) (jurisdictional dispute strike); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1967) (duty of fair representation); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) (representation
questions); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n. 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (discrimination based on union activity). See Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
68. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967): Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
69. E.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
70. 460 U.S. 669 (1983).
71. Id. Justice White delivered the Court's opinion. joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Powell and O'Connor.
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employer. The supervisor's section 8(b)(1)(A) and (B) unfair labor practice charges
were dismissed by the NLRB Regional Director on the grounds that there was
insufficient evidence that the union had caused the discharge, that there was a lack of
evidence indicating the union had restrained or coerced the employer in the selection
of its representative for bargaining purposes, and because the discharge was based
upon the employer's changes in supervisory structure. The state court complaint
claimed that the union had interfered with the contract between the supervisor and his
employer, and that the union representative had maliciously coerced the employer
into breaching the employment contract.
The Supreme Court found that the union's conduct was arguably prohibited by
both sections 8(b)(1)(A) and (B). 72 The Court rejected the theory that dismissal of the
complaint by the Regional Director for insufficient evidence of a violation satisfied
federal law interests and cleared the way for a state cause of action. The Court found
that the complainant had not adequately submitted his dispute to the Board, noting
that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies by an appeal to the General
Counsel. Since the issue was arguably within NLRB jurisdiction, Garmon principles
and concern for uniform adjudication and enforcement of national labor policy
required the issue be left to the NLRB.
[T]he Garmon pre-emption doctrine not only mandates the substantive pre-emption by the
federal labor law in the areas to which it applies, but also protects the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Board over matters arguably within the reach of the Act. Even if Jones had satisfied
ordinary primary-jurisdiction requirements, which he did not, he would not have taken
adequate account of the decision of Congress to vest in one administrative agency
nationwide jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies within the Act's purview. Matters within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board are normally for it, not a state court, to decide. This
implements the congressional desire to achieve uniform as well as effective enforcement of
the national labor policy. 73
The Court noted that the federal and state claims were the same in a fundamental
respect, in that both turned on the issue of union causation of the discharge. 74 The
Regional Director found that the union was not responsible, that the same issue would
have been presented to the Board (which had jurisdiction) had a complaint issued, and
that the issue was one that would recurringly be at the core of section 8(b)(1)(B)
cases. Since Jones sought to relitigate that same question in the state courts "[t]he
risk of interference with the Board's jurisdiction [was] thus obvious and
substantial.' ' 75
Accordingly, the Court found that the supervisor's damage action for interference
with contractual relationships was not merely of peripheral concern to federal labor
72. The Court found the case substantially controlled by Local No. 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers Union v.
Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963), in which the Court found a supervisor's common-law tort action for interference with a
contract of employment preempted because the conduct was arguably subject to §§ 7 and 8.
73. Jones, 460 U.S. at 680-81.
74. The Court found Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978),
distinguishable since the state trespass claim there focused upon the location of the picketing whereas the unfair labor
practice charges would have focused upon the objective.
75. Jones. 460 U.S. at 683.
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policy, and also that the claim was not so deeply rooted in local law that the state's
interest overrode interference with the federal labor law. The Court also noted that
because employees have a protected right to exert noncoercive influence on the choice
of low-level supervisors, the supervisor's complaint, had it come before the Board,
would arguably have been rejected because the union's conduct was protected activity.
2. Union Misrepresentation of Supervisor's Statutory Protection
In International Longshoremen's Association v. Davis,76 the Court held that
Gannon preemption is a nonwaivable foreclosure of a state court's adjudicatory
jurisdiction. 77 The Court held further that a discharged supervisor's state court suit
against a union for fraud and misrepresentation 78 was not preempted since no
showing was made that the supervisor was arguably an employee protected by the
NLRA. 79 The arguably protected or prohibited precondition for Garmon protection
requires evidence sufficient to reasonably support an NLRB interpretation of statutory
coverage. "[A] party asserting pre-emption must make an affirmative showing that
the activity is arguably subject to the Act ... "80 Here the union made no factual or
legal showing, and an independent search of the record failed to make even a
colorable claim that the supervisor was arguably an employee.8 '
3. Disqualification of Racketeers from Union Office
In Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees International Union Local 54,82 the
Court held that New Jersey's disqualification of racketeers from union office in the
casino gambling industry was not preempted by section 7.83 The Court rejected the
76. 476 U.S. 380 (1986).
77. Id. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court on this part, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun. Justice Rehnquist filed an opinion dissenting from this part but concurring in the
judgment, joined by Justices Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Garmon focuses upon the danger of state interference with
NLRB exclusive jurisdiction, said the Court, so that -[ijf there is pre-emption under Garmon, then state jurisdiction is
extinguished." Id. at 391. The peripheral concern and local interests exceptions merely define the scope of Garmon
preemption; they do not redefine its jurisdictional nature. Accordingly, the union did not waive its preemption claim by
failing to assert it until its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
78. Id. at 380. The supervisor alleged that contrary to the union's protective assurances he was discharged for his
organizational activities for a supervisory unit.
79. Id. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court on this part, joined by all Members except Justice
Blaekmun who dissented from this part and the judgment.
80. Id. at 399. Neither conclusory assertions of preemption, nor lack of final NLRB determination of the status of
the conduct, meet the burden of establishing an arguable case. The burden is affirmatively evidentiary.
81. Id. at 398. Indeed, the record revealed that an NLRB Regional Director declined to issue a complaint
concerning the discharge of a co-supervisor, having found the individual was a statutory supervisor under section 2(11),
and no evidence otherwise linked the discharge to protected activity. The Court noted that determinations of supervisory
status depend upon actual duties.
In dissent. Justice Blackmun argued that the inherently fact-specific and difficult nature of supervisory determina-
tions, and the need for uniformity of interpretation, require preemption until the supervisory status of the individuals in
question is definitively settled by the NLRB. By evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence the court will usurp the NLRB
function. In Justice Blackmun's view, the "new standard" (Id. at 408 n.6) represented an indirect continuation of Justice
White's alleged long-standing effort to eliminate the arguably protected branch of Garmnon preemption doctrine. Id. at 406
n.3.
82. 468 U.S. 491 (1984).
83. Id. Justice O'Connor delivered theopinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun
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contention that the state disqualification conflicted with the section 7 right to choose
a bargaining representative. 84 In the Court's view, subsequent Landrum-Griffin
Act 85 disqualification of certain convicted felons from union office8 6 clearly showed
that Congress did not consider the section 7 right of officer selection absolute. 87
Further, that Act expressly disclaimed preemption of state regulation of union officer
responsibility. 88 Moreover, congressional approval of an interstate compact between
New York and New Jersey to combat waterfront labor union corruption reflected the
compatibility of section 7 and certain state disqualification. 89 Accordingly, the Court
found no actual conflict and thus no preemption. 90
4. Contract Debarment of NLRA Violators
In Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould,
Inc.,9t the Court held that a Wisconsin statute debarring certain repeat NLRA
violators from doing business with the state92 was preempted by the NLRA. 93
Because the debarment statute served clearly as a supplemental sanction for
enforcement of the NLRA, it conflicted with the integrated and comprehensive
system of regulation administered by the NLRB. 94 "[T]he Garmon rule prevents
States not only from setting forth standards of conduct inconsistent with the
substantive requirements of the NLRA, but also from providing their own regulatory
or judicial remedies for conduct prohibited or arguably prohibited by the Act." '95
and Rehnquist. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Jusices Powell and Stevens. Justices Brennan and
Marshall did not participate.
84. Id. Since actual federal conflict with consequent state-federal substantive conflict, and not arguable NLRB
primary jurisdiction, was asserted, the balancing test used for the local interests exception to Garmon preemption doctrine
was deemed inapplicable. The presumption of preemption applicable to the NLRB primary jurisdiction rationale admits
a balancing of state interests because "appropriate consideration for the vitality of our federal system and for a rational
allocation of functions belies any easy inference that Congress intended to deprive the States of their ability to retain
jurisdiction over such matters." Id. at 503. "If the state law regulates conduct that is actually protected by federal law,
however, pre-emption follows not as a matter of protecting primary jurisdiction, but as a matter of substantive right." Id.
Where such actual state-federal substantive conflict exists preemption follows without balancing for federal law is
paramount.
85. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1982).
87. Brown, 468 U.S. at 504. Thus, Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). was therefore deemed inapposite.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 603(a) (1982) (repealed 1982). See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 157 (1960).
89. See De Veau, 363 U.S. at 158.
90. The Court emphasized that its conclusion did not implicate the § 7 right to select a union but only the subsidiary
right to select union officials. Nor did the Court reach the validity of the sanctions imposed to effect removal of
disqualified officials-dues collection and pension and welfare fund administration prohibitions.
91. 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
92. Id. at 283-84 n. I. The statute prohibited state purchases from persons or firms found by court-enforced NLRB
orders to have violated the NLRA in three separate cases within five years. Similar state contract disqualification statutes
had been passed by Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, and Ohio.
93. Id. at 282. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
94. Id. The Court noted that while some controversy exists over the scope of NLRA preemption, the general rule
articulated in Garnon was reasonably settled "that States may not regulate activity that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or
arguably protects or prohibits." Id. at 286.
95. Id. The Court observed that whether the statute was predicated upon the state's spending or police powers, the
unacceptable potential for conflict existed. As stated in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274, 292 (1971), [i]t is the conduct being regulated, not the formal description of governing legal standards, that is the
proper focus of concern."
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While some state spending policies touching peripheral NLRA concerns, fundamen-
tal local interests, or areas intentionally left by Congress to the states might be
permissible, Wisconsin's debarment statute entailed none of these situations. The
Court stated that:
We are not faced here with a statute that can even plausibly be defended as a legitimate
response to state procurement restraints or to local economic needs, or with a law that
pursues a task Congress intended to leave to the States. The manifest purpose and inevitable
effect of the debarment rule is to enforce the requirements of the NLRA. That goal may be
laudable, but it assumes for the State of Wisconsin a role Congress reserved exclusively for
the Board. 96
5. Employer's Retaliatory Lawsuit
In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 97 the Court held that the NLRB
could not enjoin an employer's prosecution of a state court action for libel and other
torts, against employees who had engaged in organizational activity and picketing
and filed NLRB charges, 98 absent both retaliatory motive and lack of reasonable
basis. 99 While an employer's lawsuit undoubtedly can be a powerful instrument of
coercion or retaliation against protected section 7 rights, "weighty countervailing
considerations,"' 10 such as the first amendment right of access to the courts' 0' and
compelling state interests in providing civil remedies for "deeply rooted" 102 local
interests, militate against enjoining a well-founded but retaliatory lawsuit.103 Since
baseless litigation triggers neither first amendment nor state interest considerations,
however, "it is an enjoinable unfair labor practice to prosecute a baseless lawsuit
with the intent of retaliating against an employee for the exercise of rights protected
by § 7 of the NLRA."104
In making the reasonable basis inquiry, the Court said that first amendment and
state interest concerns require that the Board not intrude upon a litigant's right to have
96. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 291 (1986).
97. 461 U.S. 731 (1983). See generally, Wilson, Retaliatory Lawsuits, the NLRA, and the First Amendment: A
Proposed Accommodation of Competing Interests, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1235 (1985).
98. Following her discharge, a senior employee and others picketed the employer with signs claiming the employer
was unfair, and distributed leaflets accusing management of engaging in sexual advances towards female employees and
maintaining a filthy women's restroom. The employer filed a state court action alleging mass picketing, blocking of
ingress and egress, creating a threat of public safety, and libel. Unfair labor practice complaints based on the discharge
and lawsuit were consolidated for hearing. Based upon the record, including credibility resolutions, the ALJ, affirmed by
the Board, concluded that the obstruction charges were unfounded, that the libel count was baseless because the leaflet
statements were true. and that the suit was therefore retaliatory and violative of §§ 8(a)(l) and (4). The Board's position,
according to the Court, was that retaliatory motive, not lack of merit, to the employer's suit was the only essential element.
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 733-34.
99. Justice White delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion. Id. at
733, 750.
100. Id. at 741.
101. "[T~he right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for
redress of grievances." Id. at 741.
102. Id.
103. "[Allthough it is an unfair labor practice to prosecute an unmeritorious lawsuit for a retaliatory purpose, the
offense is not enjoinable unless the suit lacks a reasonable basis." Id. at 749.
104. Id. at 744.
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factual disputes resolved by jury and legal questions by the state judiciary. 10 5
Accordingly, if the Board's reasonable basis inquiry reveals that genuine material,
factual, or legal issues exist, the Board must await state court adjudication of the
merits of the state suit.' 0 6
B. The Machinists Strand
1. Damage Actions by Displaced Strike Replacements
In Belknap, Inc. v. Hale,10 7 the Court held that a state court misrepresentation
and breach-of-contract action against the employer by displaced strike replacements
was not preempted.' 0 8 During an economic strike, arguably converted to an unfair
labor practice strike, the employer hired strike replacements as "regular full time
permanent replacement[s]" 109 and thereafter reassured them that they would continue
as "permanent replacement employees" when the strike ended."10 Pursuant to a
strike settlement with the union, the employer agreed to reinstate the strikers and laid
off the replacements. "' The displaced replacements sued in state court for misrep-
resentation and breach-of-contract, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The
Court found that neither the Machinists nor Garmon preemption doctrines preempted
the suit.
The Court rejected the argument, predicated upon Machinists, that the state
action was an impermissible regulation of and burden upon the employer's right to
hire permanent replacements. While federal law may license free use of economic
weapons by the parties against each other, the Court said that it does not authorize the
employer or union to injure innocent third parties in disregard of normal rules of law
governing those relationships. While federal law may also favor settlement of labor
disputes, this does not relieve an employer from liability for repeated assurances of
permanent employment or otherwise actionable misrepresentations to obtain such
replacements. The rights and interests of the replacements may not be so ignored.
Paramount federal law may well permit an employer to terminate permanent
replacements if a strike settlement or unfair labor practice strike determination
occurs, and thereby render an offer of permanent employment necessarily conditional
105. Id. at 748. The Court found that the AU erred in weighing the evidence and making credibility judgments. The
inquiry should have been confined to whether the factual issues were genuine and material, i.e., genuine issues whether
the leaflet statements were knowingly false. Id.
106. State judgment for the employer entitles the employer to prevail before the Board, "for the filing of a
meritorious lawsuit, even for a retaliatory motive, is not an unfair labor practice." Id. at 747. An adverse state judgment,
withdrawal, or other showing of lack of merit, entitles the Board to proceed to consider unmeritoriousness in determining
retaliatory motive and to reimburse wrongfully sued employees for attorney's fees and other expenses.
107. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
108. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist,
Stevens and O'Connor. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, joined
by Justices Marshall and Powell. Id. at 493, 513, 523.
109. Id. at 495.
110. Id.
Ill. In light of the strike settlement, the NLRB Regional Director agreed to withdrawal and dismissal of unfair labor
practice charges and complaints against both parties, including an alleged §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) unilateral wage increase. Id.
at 496.
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and nonpermanent to some degree. These qualifications do not destroy the substan-
tially permanent nature of the replacement arrangement, however, nor permit the
employer to deceive replacements concerning such inherent or implied conditions.
The Court stated:
An employment contract with a replacement promising permanent employment, subject only
to settlement with its employees' union and to a Board unfair labor practice order directing
reinstatement of strikers, would not in itself render the replacement a temporary employee
subject to displacement by a striker over the employer's objection during or at the end of
what is proved to be a purely economic strike.' 2
By making its offer to replacements conditional, the employer may avoid conflicting
obligations to strikers and replacements, and thereby limit its risk of liability to
displaced replacements. Since the employer can protect itself against liability, there
is no adverse impact on settlement potential.13
Nor did Garmon doctrine preempt the action, for the state court and NLRB
controversies were not identical."t 4 The questions of whether the employer's
unilateral wage increase created an unfair labor practice strike, and rendered the
offers of permanent employment unfair labor practices, concerned rights of strikers.
The question of misrepresentation concerned misrepresentations to replacements.
The misrepresentation action was thus "of no more than peripheral concern to the
Board and federal law [whereas] . . . Kentucky surely has a substantial interest in
protecting its citizens from misrepresentations that have caused them grievous
harm." "1 5 The Court found that the state's interests clearly outweighed any potential
interference with the Board's function."16 Similarly, the state damage action for
breach of contract did not intrude upon NLRB jurisdiction or federal law interests in
ensuring striker reinstatement under the NLRA. In short, NLRB-NLRA and state
interests were discrete concerns.
112. Id. at 503. Absent a strike settlement or unfair labor practice determination necessitating displacement, the
promise of permanency has great significance to the replacements. That promise constitutes a legitimate justification to
refuse reinstatement for economic strikers under NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.. 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967). The Court
noted further:
That the offer and promise of permanent employment are conditional does not render the hiring any less
permanent if the conditions do not come to pass. All hirings are to some extent conditional. As the Board
recognizes . . . although respondents were hired on a permanent basis, they were subject to discharge in the
event of a business slowdown. Had Belknap not settled and no unfair labor practices been filed, surely it would
have been free to retain respondents and obligated to do so by the terms of its promises to them. The result
should be the same if Belknap had promised to retain them if it did not settle with the union and if it were not
ordered to reinstate strikers.
Belknap, 463 U.S. at 504, n.8.
113. Any dilemma created by unconditional commitments to replacements, noted the Court, is therefore of the
employer's own making. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) (employer bound by
conflicting obligations assumed under EEOC conciliation agreement and labor contract).
114. In the Court's view, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978). emphasized that a critical
inquiry in applying the Garmon rules, where the conduct at issue in the state litigation is said to be arguably prohibited
by the Act and hence within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, is whether the controversy presented to the state court
is identical with that which could be presented to the Board. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 510 (1983).
115. Id. at 511.
116. The Court noted that the strikers could not obtain reinstatement or other relief through the state misrepresen-
tation action, and the replacements could obtain no damages or other relief before the NLRB. Id. at 512.
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2. Minimum Employment Standards and Benefits
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts," 7 the Court held that
state-mandated minimum mental health benefit laws"18 were not preempted by the
NLRA.' 19 Applying a Machinists preemption analysis, the Court found that while
mandated-benefit laws have an impact upon mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining under the NLRA, Congress did not intend to preclude the states from
establishing minimum employment standards.120 "To the contrary, we believe that
Congress developed the framework for self-organization and collective bargaining of
the NLRA within the larger body of state law promoting public health and safety." ' 2'
The NLRA was concerned with inequality of bargaining power and depressed
wage rates, said the Court, and compatible state protective labor legislation raises no
conflict. Such minimum standards impact equally on union and nonunion employees,
neither encourage nor discourage collective bargaining processes, have little effect
upon self-organization, and focus upon individual, not collective, interests. 122
Viewed against the myriad of state laws that had established minimum labor
standards prior to enactment of the NLRA, "[flederal labor law in this sense is
interstitial, supplementing state law where compatible, and supplanting it only when
it prevents the accomplishment of the purposes of the federal Act." 2 3 Accordingly,
"[w]hen a state law establishes a minimal employment standard not inconsistent with
the general legislative goals of the NLRA, it conflicts with none of the purposes of
the Act." 124
117. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
118. The state law required any general health insurance policy providing hospital and surgical coverage, or benefit
plan with such coverage, to furnish minimum mental health coverage. Id. at 727.
119. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Powell did not participate. Id. at 727,
758. The Court also held that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982),
did not preempt such laws. Id. at 733.
120. The origins of Machinists preemption doctrine were summarized as follows in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 749 (1985):
The doctrine was designed, at least initially, to govern pre-emption questions that arose concerning activity that
was neither arguably protected against employer interference by §§ 7 and 8(a)(l) of the NLRA, nor arguably
prohibited as an unfair labor practice by § 8(b) of that Act .... Such action falls outside the reach of Garmon
pre-emption.
See also, New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 529-31 (1979) (plurality opinion).
121. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 756. The Court noted that the states traditionally have possessed broad
authority under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship, e.g., child labor, minimum and other wages,
occupational health and safety, unemployment and workers compensation, holidays, and poll orjury duty. Id. The Court
also noted the settled applicability of federal minimal labor standards to the unionized sector. Id. at 757. See, e.g.,
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737, 739 (1981) (wages). Cf Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (equal employment).
122. No NLRA purpose would be served by facilitating collective bargaining exemption from state labor standards.
The Court commented that "[lit would turn the policy that animated the Wagner Act on its head to understand it to have
penalized workers who have chosen to join a union by preventing them from benefiting from state labor regulations
imposing minimal standards on nonunion employers." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 756.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 757. See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978) (state minimum funding and vesting levels
for employee pension plans not preempted).
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3. Requirement of Plant Closing Severance Pay
In Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,'2 5 the Court held that a Maine statute
requiring employers upon plant closing to make a one-time severance payment to
employees 126 not contractually entitled to severance pay was not preempted by the
NLRA. 127 Applying a Machinists preemption analysis, the Court found the statute a
valid and unexceptional exercise of traditional state police powers over health and
safety (i.e., establishment of minimum labor standards) that did not impermissibly
intrude upon the federal enclave of free collective bargaining. 28 The NLRA does not
preempt all state regulatory power over subjects of bargaining. ' 29 Nonintrusiveness
was enhanced by the statutory exception for negotiated severance. Since Metropol-
itan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusettst 30 upheld a state statute mandating mini-
mum mental health benefits that permitted no collective bargaining, "surely one that
permits such bargaining cannot be preempted."' 13'
4. City Franchise Conditioned on Strike Settlement
In Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, t 32 the Court held that the
city's conditioned renewal of a taxicab franchise upon a strike settlement and
subsequent refusal to renew the franchise because of strike continuation 33 was
preempted by the NLRA. 134 Under Machinists preemption doctrine, Congress
intentionally prohibited some forms of economic pressure and left others unregulated;
states may not impose additional restrictions upon permissible economic tactics such
as the right to strike or the right to withstand the strike. 35 The NLRA essentially
leaves the bargaining process to the parties, and imposes no time limits on bargaining
125. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
126. The statute obligated employers with over 100 employees to provide one week's pay per year of service upon
plant closing or relocation beyond 100 miles, unless the employee accepted employment at the new location, was covered
by an express contract providing for severance pay, or had less than three years seniority. Id. at 4.
127. Id. at 6. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun. Powell,
and Stevens. Id. at 3. The Court also held that the statute was not preempted by ERISA. Id. at 23. Justice White filed
a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia. Id.
128. Garmon analysis was inapplicable, noted the Court, for the statute did not purport to regulate any conduct
subject to NLRB regulation. Id. at 11-12.
129. The Court stated that:
It is true that the Maine statute gives employees something for which they otherwise might have to bargain. That
is true, however, with regard to any state law that substantively regulates employment conditions. Both
employers and employees come to the bargaining table with rights under state law that form a 'backdrop' for
their negotiations.
Id. at 21.
130. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
131. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 22 (1987).
132. 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
133. During pendency of the employer's taxicab franchise renewal application, the employer's drivers struck over
labor contract negotiations. The city conditioned franchise renewal upon settlement of the labor dispute prior to franchise
expiration the following week, and, failing dispute resolution, the franchise expired. Id. at 610-11.
134. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan,
White. Marshall. Powell. Stevens and O'Connor. Id. at 609. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 620.
135. Having found that the city directly interfered with a central NLRA concern, the bargaining process, the Court
did not consider whether the peripheral concern exception to Garmon analysis applies to Machinists analysis. The
employer relied upon Machinists. not Garnon. Id. at 617-19.
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negotiations or the economic struggle. "The parties' resort to economic pressure was
a legitimate part of their collective-bargaining process . . . [b]ut the bargaining
process was thwarted when the city in effect imposed a positive durational limit on
the exercise of economic self-help." 136
5. Unemployment Compensation Disqualification for Financing Strike
In Baker v. General Motors Corp., 137 the Court held that state disqualification
from unemployment compensation for employees who financed a strike by other than
regular union dues, the strike causing their unemployment, 38 was not preempted by
the NLRA. 139 Under the Social Security Act of 1935, Congress left to the states the
policy choice of paying or denying unemployment compensation to strikers. 40 The
distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment was the congression-
ally intended key to eligibility. While financing a strike may entail associational and
bargaining rights protected by section 7 of the NLRA against employer retaliation,
the voluntary nature of resultant unemployment justifies state determination of the
compensation question. 141 Emphasizing the significance of voluntary and involuntary
unemployment under the Social Security Act, the Court stated that:
[A]n employee's decision to participate in a strike, either directly or by financing it, is not
only an obvious example of causing one's own unemployment-it is one that furthers the
federal policy of free collective bargaining regardless of whether or not a State provides
compensation for employees who are furloughed as a result of the labor dispute. 142
C. The Lucas Flour Strand
1. Bad Faith Handling of Insurance Claim
In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 143 the Court held that an employee's state tort
action against an employer and insurer for bad faith handling of a claim under a
136. Id. at 615. "Even though agreement is sometimes impossible, government may not step in and become a party
to the negotiations." id. at 619. That the city purported to exercise a traditional municipal function of regulating
transportation, not labor, did not legitimize the city's impermissible intrusion into the substantive aspects of the bargaining
process and consequent disruption of the balance of power designed by Congress.
137. 478 U.S. 621 (1986).
138. The disqualified employees had paid emergency dues to augment the union's general strike insurance fund
during national negotiations, and were subsequently unemployed by a temporary curtailment of operations because of
local union strikes at other plants. As construed by the Michigan Supreme Court, the financing disqualification required
a meaningful connection between the financing and the strikes, so that essentially only strikers were disqualified. Relying
on the purpose, amount, and timing of the emergency dues, the court found the requisite causal connection in that the dues
actually supported the strikes, the strikes were foreseeable when the dues were collected, and the resultant unemployment
was foreseeable. By such direct involvement in the labor dispute the employees were voluntarily unemployed. Id. at
623-28.
139. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Id. at
622, 638.
140. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
141. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967), was deemed distinguishable since the impermissible
compensation disqualification of an employee discharged for filing an NLRB charge involved involuntary unemployment.
Id. at 636-37.
142. Baker. 478 U.S. at 638. The Court specifically disclaimed consideration of a disqualification based on payment
of regular union dues. Id.
143. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
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nonoccupational disability insurance plan incorporated in a collective bargaining
agreement' 44 was preempted by federal labor contract law under section 301.145 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court viewed the tort claim as independent of any breach of
contract claim, since the Wisconsin tort of bad faith handling of an insurance claim
was predicated not upon an express contract provision, but rather on the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in every contract. The Wisconsin court
assumed that the labor contract covered only the payment but not the manner of
payment of insurance benefits. The United States Supreme Court rejected that
analysis and assumption, and found that the bad faith claim was "rooted in
contract."1 46
Since the labor contract incorporated a special grievance-arbitration procedure
covering "any insurance-related issues that may arise," 147 the Court said that federal,
not state law required that an arbitrator decide whether the employer breached any
implied contract provision concerning timely payment of benefits. 48 The difference
between, or extent of, any implied or express duties "depends upon the terms of the
agreement between the parties, [and] both are tightly bound with questions of contract
interpretation that must be left to federal law."'149
Because the state tort law did not confer "nonnegotiable state-law rights...
independent of any right established by contract [but rather was] inextricably
intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract,"'' 50 the state law
was preempted by section 301. Section 301 preemption was further necessitated to
preserve the centrality and effectiveness of arbitration and to preclude bypassing the
arbitrator. Exhaustion of the grievance-arbitration procedure would have been a
condition precedent to a section 301 contract claim. The court stated that "[p]erhaps
the most harmful aspect of the Wisconsin decision is that it would allow essentially
the same suit to be brought directly in state court without first exhausting the
144. The employee claimed that his disability payments were arbitrarily interrupted and that he was subjected to
excessive medical examinations. Id. at 205.
145. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Powell did not participate. Id. at 203,
221.
146. Id. at 220. The preemptive effect of § 301 extends to questions concerning contract meaning and consequences
of breach whether a state action is characterized as contract or tort. *'Any other result would elevate form over substance
and allow parties to evade the requirements of § 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach of
contract." Id. at 211.
147. Id. at 204.
148. "'The assumption that the labor contract creates no implied rights is not one that state law may make." Id. at
215,
149. Id. at 216. The Court stated further that "I[b]ecause the right asserted not only derives from the contract, but
is defined by the contractual obligation of good faith, any attempt to assess liability here inevitably will involve contract
interpretation." Id. at 218.
150. Id. at 213. Distinguishing preemption based upon actual federal protection from that based upon NLRB primary
jurisdiction, the Court noted as follows:
So-called Garmon pre-emption involves protecting the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB, and requires a
balancing of state and federal interests. The present tort suit would allow the State to provide a rule of decision
where Congress has mandated that federal law should govern. In this situation the balancing of state and federal
interests required by Garmon pre-emption is irrelevant, since Congress, acting within its power under the
commerce clause, has provided that federal law must prevail.
Id. at 214 n.9.
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grievance procedures established in the bargaining agreement."115' Preemption is
required to preserve the parties' federal right to make a neutral arbitrator their contract
interpreter. 152
The Court emphasized that not every state action related to a labor contract is
preempted by section 301, and that "[t]he full scope of the pre-emptive effect of
federal labor-contract law remains to be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis." 5 3
Where resolution of the state claim is "substantially dependent upon the terms of...
a labor contract,"' 54 however, the claim must be brought under section 301 or
dismissed as preempted.
2. Negligent Union Failure to Provide Safe Workplace
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 155 the Court held
that an injured employee's state court negligence action against a union, predicated
upon an alleged duty of care arising from the labor contract's safety and working
requirement provisions, 56 was preempted by section 301 of the NLRA.t57 Ascer-
tainment of tort liability turned upon the existence, nature, and scope of any implied
duty of care imposed upon the union by the contract. Tort liability was therefore
inextricably intertwined with consideration of the contract terms, and was thus not
sufficiently independent of the contract to withstand the preemptive force of section
301.158 Since questions of contract interpretation underlay the negligence determi-
nation, "[t]he need for federal uniformity in the interpretation of contract terms
therefore mandates that here, as in Allis-Chalmers, respondent is precluded from
evading the pre-emptive force of § 301 by casting her claim as a state-law tort
action."1 59
151. Id. at 219.
152. The Court stated that:
Since nearly any alleged willful breach of contract can be restated as a tort claim for breach of a good-faith
obligation undera contract, the arbitrator's role in every case could be bypassed easily if § 301 is not understood
to pre-empt such claims. Claims involving vacation or overtime pay. .. -in short, the whole range of disputes
traditionally resolved through arbitration-could be brought in the first instance in state court by a complaint
in tort rather than in contract. A rule that permitted an individual to sidestep available grievance procedures
would cause arbitration to lose most of its effectiveness . . . as well as eviscerate a central tenet of federal
labor-contract law under § 301, that it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the responsibility to interpret the
labor contract in the first instance.
Id. at 219-20.
153. Id. at 220.
154. Id.
155. 481 U.S. 851 (1987).
156. Id. at 859-62. The gravamen of the complaint was that the union breached a duty of care to provide the
employee a safe workplace, which duty arose from contracts between the employer and union to which the employee was
a third-party beneficiary. The complaint alleged the union was negligent in allowing the employee to be assigned to a
dangerous job beyond her capacities. Id. at 853.
157. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan.
White, Marshall, Powell, O'Connor and Scalia. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the preemption
determination. Id. at 852, 865.
158. The parties disagreed whether the action should be characterized as a duty of fair representation or independent
§ 301 claim, and the Court remanded for consideration of the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 864-65. Justice
Stevens viewed the matter as a clearly time-barred fair representation claim, and dissented from the remand. Id. at 865.
159. Id. at 862.
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3. Wrongful Discharge Action Upon Individual Contract
In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, t6 0 the Court held that terminated employees'
state court breach of contract action, based upon individual employment contracts
made while the employees worked in non-bargaining unit managerial and other
salaried positions, t6 ' was not preempted by section 301 and therefore not removable
to federal court. ' 62 Since the claims were neither founded directly or indirectly on the
labor contract, nor substantially dependent on analysis or interpretation of the labor
contract, nor concerned with the relationship between the individual and labor
contracts, section 301 was not preemptive. 163 The fact that the employees may have
returned to the bargaining unit and also possessed substantial rights under the labor
contract did not preclude their choice to pursue independent claims based on the
individual employment contracts. 164 "[A] plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining
agreement is permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agreement, including
state-law contract rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collective-
bargaining agreement." 6 5
4. Retaliatory Discharge Under Workers' Compensation Laws
In Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 166 the Court held that a state
court tort action for retaliatory discharge for asserting rights under workers'
compensation laws,' 67 by an employee covered by just cause provisions of a labor
contract, 168 was not preempted by section 301.169 Since the purely factual questions
of conduct and motivation in the state action neither entailed court interpretation of
the labor contract terms nor turned upon the meaning thereof, the state-law remedy
160. 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
161. The employees, transferred out of the bargaining unit for periods ranging from three to fifteen years and
thereafter returned, alleged that when the plant closed they were laid off contrary to oral and written assurances, made
while serving as managers or weekly salaried employees, of definite and lasting employment at some company facility.
Id. at 388-91.
162. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Id. at 388.
163. The Court noted that "[slection 301 says nothing about the content or validity of individual employment
contracts." Id. at 394. Nor did J. 1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944), hold that all individual employment
contracts or state claims based thereon are inevitably superseded, subsumed or eliminated by a collective bargaining
agreement covering the employee. Id. at 395-96.
164. The Court noted that neither § 301 nor any other federal law preempts all employment-related matters
concerning unionized employees or tangentially involving a labor contract. "Claims bearing no relationship to a
collective-bargaining agreement beyond the fact that they are asserted by an individual covered by such an agreement are
simply not pre-empted by § 301." Id. at 397 n.10. Since the individual claims were outside the labor contract's
grievance-arbitration process, national labor policy favoring arbitration was not implicated.
165. Id. at 396. The removal analysis focused upon whether the employees' claim arose under federal law, and
potential employer defenses, based on Machinists or Garmon preemption or on interpretation of the labor contract, did
not transform the action into a federal claim. That the claims might ultimately prove preempted or otherwise barred by
federal law did not make them removable. Id. at 398-99.
166. 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988) on remand. 823 F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1988).
167. Illinois recognized the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim, and provided for
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 1881. The employer discharged the employee for allegedly filing a false claim.
Id. at 1879.
168. The employee also filed a grievance under the labor contract and ultimately prevailed before an arbitrator who
ordered reinstatement and backpay. Id. at 1879.
169. Id. at 1883. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Id. at 1878.
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was independent of the labor contract.' 70 The Court stated that "the sense of
'independent' that matters for § 301 preemption purposes [is that] resolution of the
state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement." 17'
While the state-law and arbitrator-contract actions might implicate the same
factual analyses, such parallelism does not make the state-law analysis dependent on
the contractual analysis. For section 301 preemption purposes, the state claim is
independent if it can be resolved without interpreting the labor contract. ' 72 Given the
requisite independence, the state and arbitral determinations need not comport.
V. REFLECTIONS
Upon conception of this essay my thought was that labor preemption doctrine
was in subtle transition toward decentralization and nonpreemption. Several cases in
the late 1970s suggested increased tolerance of and deference toward state
regulation, 173 and concomitant erosion of traditional preemption doctrine. 174 Careful
reading, analysis, and reflection of the cases of the last decade call my perception into
question. As Holmes reminds, "I hardly think it advisable to shape general theory
from the exception .... 175
At the same time, however, I also disagree with the Chief Justice's concern,
related at the outset of the essay, over a burgeoning labor preemption doctrine. In my
view, the decisions reflect the same sensitive analysis of conflicting state-federal
interests that has traditionally marked labor, if not all, preemption adjudication. 176
170. "[l]nterpretation of collective-bargaining agreements remains firmly in the arbitral realm .... " Id. at 1884.
17 I. ld. at 1882. Lucas Flour, Allis-Chalmers, and Hechler were distinguishable, since relevant principles of state
law necessitated construction of the labor contract.
172. The Court observed that:
[W]hile there may be instances in which the National Labor Relations Act pre-empts state law on the basis of
the subject matter of the law in question, [i.e., Garmon or Machinists preemption) § 301 pre-emption merely
ensures that federal law will be the basis for interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, and says nothing
about the substantive rights a State may provide to workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend
upon the interpretation of such agreements.
id. at 1883.
173. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979) (payment of unemployment
compensation to strikers); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (trespass law applied to
peaceful picketing arguably protected and prohibited); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978) (regulation
of negotiated pension plan).
174. See generally A. Cox, D. BoK & R. GORMAN, supra note 4 ("retreat from a broad preemption philosophy");
J. GERTMAN & B. POGREBIN, supra note 28, at 345 ("The area of trespass represents the first sign of judicial retreat from
an absolutist approach to preemption issues where protected activity is concerned."); W. OBERER. K. HANSLONVE, 1.
ANDERSEN & T. HEINSZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw-COtLscrlvE BARGAINING IN A FREE SocirY 371 (1986)
("the seeming (and confusing) erosion of the doctrine"); C. SUMMERS, H. VELLINGTON & A. HYDE, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LABOR LAW 1068 (2d ed. 1982) ("How much is left of the 'arguably prohibited' category?"); Modjeska, The Supreme
Court and the Diversification of National Labor Policy, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 37. 37. 58 (1979) ("In three decisions
... [Sears, Malone, New York Tel.] the Court opened the administration of national labor relations policy to the states....
[The] decisions suggest a trend toward decentralization and diversification.").
175. 0. W. HOLMES, The Path of the Last, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 176 (1920).
176. One is reminded of the words of Garnon's author, Justice Frankfurter, written over forty years ago in Hill v.
Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 552 (1945) (dissenting opinion), which offer an apt description of the Court's approach to labor
preemption over the last decade:
A survey of the scores of cases in which the claim has been made that State action cannot survive some
contradictory command of Congress leaves no doubt that State action has not been set aside on mere generalities
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Despite episodic shadings of language and emphasis, the essence of traditional
preemption analysis-real conflict-appears extant, if not vibrant. Thus, under
traditional Garmon principles used in Jones, litigation by the discharged supervisor
in state court of the identical union-causation issue subject to NLRB jurisdiction
raised substantial risk of conflict with that NLRB jurisdiction. The traditional
considerations of uniformity and effective enforcement of national labor policy that
underlie NLRB primary jurisdiction or exclusivity thus prevailed absent overriding
state interests. Similarly, in Gould, Wisconsin's attempt to rewrite the NLRA through
its recidivist debarment statute was not only in patent conflict with the NLRA
remedial scheme but also unsupported by legitimate state needs.
Conversely, by underscoring the touchstone of real and not imaginary conflict,
Davis required at least a colorable claim of NLRB exclusivity before divestment of
state court adjudicatory jurisdiction over the discharged supervisor's fraud suit
against the union. Brown permitted state racketeering regulation that was not in actual
conflict with the NLRA and implicitly approved by Congress. Belknap upheld the
displaced strike replacements' misrepresentation and breach-of-contract action where
the state and federal controversies were not identical, the misrepresentation action
had no NLRB concern, and the state's interests were substantial. And Bill Johnson's
tolerance of well-founded but retaliatory lawsuits reemphasized the Court's solicitude
for "deeply rooted" local interests.
Under traditional Machinists principles, the Court in Belknap upheld the
displaced strike replacements' damage action since federal solicitude for unregulated
disputes did not necessitate tolerance of innocent third-party injury. Similarly, the
Court's acceptance of minimum mental-health benefits in Metropolitan Life and
severance pay in Fort Halifax reveal that it is too late in the decisional day to strike
down state protective labor legislation merely because of an impact upon collective
bargaining. Contrasting the nonpreemption of General Motors' unemployment
compensation disqualification of strikers who finance the strike with the preemption
of Golden State's taxicab franchise conditioned on strike settlement emphasizes the
classic focus upon congressional intention and real conflict. Voluntary strike
participation furthers free collective bargaining while burdensome restrictions on
permissible economic tactics do not.
The evolving Lucas Flour strand continues traditional analytic focus upon real
conflict. In Allis-Chalmers, preemption was required of a tort action for bad faith
handling of an insurance claim "rooted" in the labor contract to avoid conflict with
federal labor law generally and the primary jurisdiction of the arbitrator particularly.
about Congress having "occupied the field." or on the basis of loose talk instead of demonstrations about
"'conflict" between State and federal action. We are in the domain of government and practical affairs, and this
Court has not stifled State action, unless what the State has required, in the light of what Congress has ordered.
would truly entail contradictory duties or make actual, not argumentative, inroads on what Congress has
commanded or forbidden.
Constitutional exercises of state authority were not to be displaced "cavalierly, on the basis of loose inference and
dogmatic assertion," continued Justice Frankfurter, but were to be "examined with painstaking care . . . in order to
ascertain whether, in their practical operation, they ran counter to the scheme as conceived by Congress and impinged
upon its administration." Id. at 554.
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Similarly, the negligence action against the union for failure to provide a safe
workplace in Hechler was preempted since the claim was inextricably intertwined
with labor contract terms. Conversely, no real conflict existed, and preemption was
not required, over the wrongful discharge action based upon an individual contract in
Caterpillar, since the claim was based upon rights independent of the labor contract.
Nor was preemption required in Lingle, for the workers' compensation retaliatory
discharge claim did not depend upon construction of the labor contract and was thus
independent of it.
I submit that the labor milieu, not preemption analysis, is in transition. The
limitations, if not failures, of collective bargaining, 77 declining unionism, 78 the
individual and civil rights explosion, 79 erosion of the employment-at-will
doctrine, 180 and the concomitant and resultant proliferation of state (legislative and
judicial) protective labor and employment law,' 8 ' underlie the myriad preemption
177. Collective bargaining has obviously had extensive qualitative radiations. For example, 1988 median earnings
for full-time union members were $480 weekly, for nonunion members $356. I Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 130:144 (February
6, 1989). Quantitatively, however, collective bargaining has not achieved its "'vital national purpose." (Phelps-Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 182 (1941)). Union membership comprises only 16.8 percent of the workforce. 1 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 130:143 (February 6, 1989). Private sector membership was higher in several industries, i.e.,
transportation and public utilities, 33 percent; manufacturing, 22 percent; construction, 21 percent; and mining, 19
percent. Id. at 144. Professor Weiler makes the following observation: "Contemporary American labor law more
resembles and elegant tombstone for a dying' institution. While administrators, judges, lawyers, and scholars busy
themselves with sophisticated jurisprudential refinements of the legal framework for collective bargaining, the fraction of
the work force actually engaged in collective bargaining is steadily declining. . . . No feature of contemporary
labor-management relations in the United States is more significant that the diminishing reach of collective bargaining."
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1769,
1769, 1771 (1983).
178. Labor's ostensible decline is attributed to various factors including a changing workforce, evolution of a service
and distribution economy, domestic and global competition, management antiunionism, union apathy and organizational
ineptness, NLRB and other governmental bias, and a resurgent spirit of individualism. See generally Craver, The Vitality
of the American Labor Movement in the Twenty-First Century. 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 633; Getman, Ruminations on Union
Organizing in the Private Sector, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 45 (1986); Modjeska, Reflections on the House of Labor, 41 VANo.
L. REV. 1013 (1988); Raskin, Organized Labor-A Movement in Search of a Mission: Implications for Employers and
Unions, 3 THE LABOR LAWYER 41 (1987).
179. See L. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW v-vi (2d ed. 1988):
Recent statistics illustrate the magnitude of the employment discrimination litigation explosion in recent years.
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1987, 20,128 civil rights actions were commenced in the federal district
courts, of which 8,986 were employment cases. During that same period, 3,926 civil rights cases arose in the
federal courts of appeals from the district courts, 1,393 of which were employment cases. Further, as of June
30, 1987, 2,764 governmental civil rights cases were pending in the federal district courts, of which 1,759 were
employment cases. Also as of that date, 23,352 private civil rights cases were pending in the federal district
courts, of which 10,500 were employment cases. Further, during fiscal 1987, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received 65,844 charges of unlawful employment practices. An additional
49,692 charges were received by the 81 state and local fair employment practice agencies pursuant to
worksharing agreements whereby these agencies process charges for the EEOC, for a total of 115,536 charges
during fiscal 1987.
Id. Professor Getman and Attorney Pogrebin have observed that "[t]he interests in individual rights sparked by the Civil
Rights Acts and the struggle of minorities and women to enter the workplace may have shifted the focus in
labor-management law from collective rights to individual rights." J. GETIAN & B. POGREBIN, supra note 28, at 358.
180. See generally A. HILL, "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE DEROGATION OF THE AT-WiLL EMLOYMENT DOCTRINE
(1987); W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPrLOYMENTr TERMINATION RIGHTS AND REMtEDIES (1985); L. LARSON, UuJUST
DISMISSAL (1988); H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1987).
181. Professor Summers comments as follows on the failures and limitations of collective bargaining, and the
concomitant expansion of legal regulation:
Why collective bargaining has not been more widely extended is, for present purposes, unimportant. The
significant fact is that collective bargaining does not regulate the labor market. Unions and collective agreements
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cases coming before the Court. This is the tip of the iceberg beneath the preemption
decisions of the last decade.
The work of the Court mirrors the life of the nation, and while it is all "very
quiet there .... it is the quiet of a storm centre.... ,, 82 The Court is hardly oblivious
to labor evolution, for, in Cardozo's words, "[t]he great tides and currents which
engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the judges by."'183
Whatever the next stage in labor and employment evolution, however, fundamental
notions of judicial restraint and separation of powers confine the Court to interpre-
tation and application of present declarations of national labor policy, upon which the
Garmon, Machinists, and Lucas Flour strands are predicated.
Selection of socioeconomic and legal systems to maximize employee protection
are essentially legislative, not judicial, choices. The iceberg was glimpsed in Lingle
when the Seventh Circuit favored preemption of workers' compensation retaliatory
discharge claims because the converse result was detrimental to unionism. 84 The
Supreme Court eschewed any such rationale. Whatever the merits of emerging
wrongful discharge jurisprudence, it is not for the Court as a policy matter to prefer
such recourse over NLRB, collective bargaining, and grievance-arbitration pro-
cesses.
Concepts such as "arguably subject," "left unregulated," and "contract
independent," are concededly imprecise.' 85 So too is much of the language of the
law. The genius and durability of Garmon,186 Machinists, and Lucas Flour standards
may be their very flexibility and consequent capacity for adaptation.
do not guard employees from the potential deprivations and oppressions of employer economic power. The
consequence is foreseeable, if not inevitable; if collective bargaining does not protect the individual employee,
the law will find another way to protect the weaker party. The law, either through the courts or the legislatures,
will become the guardian. Labor law is now in the midst of that changing of the guard. There is current
recognition that if the majority of employees are to be protected, it must be by the law prescribing at least certain
rights of employees and minimum terms and conditions of employment.
Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 10-11 (1988).
182. O.W. Hot.sEs, Law and the Court, in COLLEcTED LEGAL PAPERS 292 (1920).
183. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (21st printing 1971).
184. In a rather astonishing burst of political candor the court stated that:
Finally, we note that a conclusion that state retaliatory discharge claims are not preempted would be detrimental
to unions. If a state statute or common law gave all workers protection from unjustified discharges, then one
of the major recruiting points of union organizers--that unionization would protect the worker against arbitrary
discharge-would disappear. The effect of such a state system would be to make the worker less dependent on
the arbitration remedies created by the collective bargaining contract.
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031, 1047 (1987).
185. The very diversity of state regulation compels general rather than definitive preemption formulas. See
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 290 (1971) ("inherent limitations on this Court's
ability to state a workable rule that comports reasonably with apparent congressional objectives").
186. On balance, there appears to be continuing legitimacy to Norton Come's observation some years ago that,
"Itlhe Garmon doctrine has in practice provided a readily ascertainable and effective standard for effectuating Congress'
objective of attaining a uniform national labor policy by centralizing administration of the Act in a specialized agency,
the National Labor Relations Board." Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in
the Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REv. 1435, 1452 (1970).

